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Non- technical summary 
 
The objective of this study is to provide a basis for a comparison of regulatory practice and 
the justification of regulation in different network sectors. The present documentation focuses 
on the telecommunications sector. The analysis consists of three parts. The first part discusses 
the general characteristics of the telecommunications sector. The second part introduces two 
regulatory approaches that are of particular relevance for regulation in this sector. The 
analysis of these approaches is used to derive normative conclusions for regulation of 
telecommunications infrastructure. Finally, the European regulatory framework for the 
regulation of electronic communications markets is evaluated.  
 
The telecommunications sector is characterized by short- and long-run entry barriers both on 
the cost side as well as on the demand side. It is therefore susceptible to monopolization and 
the abuse of market power. The normative analysis evaluates the need for sector-specific 
regulation in the telecommunications sector. It is shown that regulation may have difficulties 
reconciling static and dynamic efficiency goals. The conflict is especially strong in dynamic 
markets such as the telecommunications market. If regulation is applied too liberally, with a 
focus on static efficiency, it can stifle dynamic efficiency. The analysis concludes that the 
disaggregated regulatory approach, which limits regulatory intervention to network areas with 
stable network-specific market power, is best at reducing the risks of overregulation while 
adequately addressing market power abuse.  
 
The comparison of the normative conclusions on regulation and the European regulatory 
framework for electronic communications markets comes to the conclusion that in many 
respects, the framework is based on economic theory and that it could principally be used to 
pursue the objective of minimal regulation. In practice, however, especially the criteria for the 
assessment of SMP (significant market power) are applied too liberally, such that 
overregulation results. 
Zusammenfassung – Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Das Ziel der vorliegenden Studie ist es eine Basis für den Vergleich der Regulierungspraxis 
und der unterschiedlichen Rechtfertigungsansätze für Regulierung in Netzwerksektoren zu 
schaffen. Im Fokus der vorliegenden Arbeit steht der Telekommunikationssektor. Die 
Analyse geht in drei Schritten vor. Zunächst werden die grundsätzlichen Eigenschaften des 
Telekommunikationssektors dargestellt. Danach werden zwei für den 
Telekommunikationssektor besonders relevante Regulierungsansätze diskutiert und normative 
Schlussfolgerungen für die Regulierung dieses Sektors hergeleitet. Anhand des normativen 
Gerüsts wird zuletzt die europäische Regulierung analysiert.  
 
Der Telekommunikationssektor ist zum einen durch seine Kostenstruktur und zum anderen 
durch seine Einflüsse auf der Nachfrageseite durch kurz- und langfristige 
Markteintrittsbarrieren gekennzeichnet, so dass auf Telekommunikationsmärkten 
strukturbedingt eine Gefahr von Monopolisierung und Marktmachtmissbrauch gegeben ist. 
Die normative Analyse zeigt den konkreten Regulierungsbedarf im 
Telekommunikationssektor auf. Zur Bestimmung dieses Bedarfs werden sowohl statische als 
auch dynamische Effizienzkriterien herangezogen. Es zeigt sich, dass zwischen diesen 
Kriterien ein Zielkonflikt entstehen kann. Aufgrund des dynamischen Charakters des 
Telekommunikationssektors besteht die Gefahr, dass durch einen zu großen Fokus auf 
statische Effizienz eine zu weitgehende Regulierung zu Lasten der dynamischen Effizienz 
erfolgt. Es wird gezeigt, dass diesem Risiko am ehesten mit dem disaggregierten 
Regulierungsansatz Rechnung getragen werden kann. Dieser Ansatz basiert auf einem 
stabilen Kriterium zur Lokalisierung von netzspezifischer Marktmacht und beschränkt 
regulatorische Eingriffe auf solche Teilbereiche von Netzsektoren, in denen stabile 
Marktmacht vorliegt.  
 
Der Vergleich der Schlussfolgerungen der normativen Analyse mit dem europäischen 
Regulierungsrahmen für den Telekommunikationssektor zeigt, dass die europäische 
Regulierung weitestgehend ökonomisch begründet wird und die Gesetzestexte für das Ziel 
einer minimalen Regulierung eingesetzt werden könnten. In der Praxis werden aber vor allem 
die Kriterien zur Bestimmung von SMP (significant market power) so umfangreich ausgelegt, 
dass eine Überregulierung erfolgt.  
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Abstract 
The telecommunications sector is characterized by economies of scale and scope, high sunk costs, 
and strong network effects. This combination may facilitate monopolization and abuse of market 
power. The present study evaluates the need for sector-specific regulation in this sector. It is 
shown that there is a conflict between static and dynamic efficiency goals. A comparison of two 
prominent regulatory approaches for the telecommunications sector shows that the disaggregated 
approach takes account of this conflict most adequately, as it is committed to minimal regulation. 
The European regulatory framework for electronic communications markets is based on economic 
theory, and could principally be used to limit regulation to network areas in which stable network-
specific market power is localized. However, especially the criteria for the assessment of 
significant market power (SMP) are applied too liberally, such that, in practice, overregulation has 
resulted. 
                                                 
1 Sections 3.2, 3.3, 4.1, 4.4, 5.2 and 5.3 of this documentation correspond to a large degree to text passages in 
Vanberg, Margit (2008), Competition and Cooperation among Internet Service Providers: A Network Economic 
Analysis, University Dissertation, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany 
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1 Introduction 
The objective of this study is to provide a basis for a comparison of regulatory practice and the 
justification of regulation in different network sectors. Such a comparison can clarify whether 
there is potential for aligning the criteria applied to determine when regulation is justified and also 
the instruments that are used in the regulation of network sectors. The present study focuses on the 
telecommunications sector.  
 
In the past decades the telecommunications sector in Europe has changed immensely. The 
progressive abolishment of legal entry barriers opened the door for a fast and dynamic 
development in this market. This was accompanied by a process of deregulation and re-regulation. 
In addition to these legal changes, telecommunications technology also experienced fundamental 
changes. Most importantly, packet-switching technology facilitated the development of the 
Internet which has lead to new dimensions in product and service variety in the 
telecommunications sector. This development is facilitating the convergence of 
telecommunications, Internet and broadcasting networks. Operators are currently migrating their 
voice services onto packet-switched networks. In the near future, a single core network will be 
used to transport data from multiple services. Current regulatory practice in traditional 
telecommunications policy will need to adapt to these changes. This study wants to provide an 
overview of the special characteristics of telecommunications markets and the implications for 
competition and regulation in this market. 
 
Chapter 2 briefly explains why network sectors are considered different to other sectors of the 
economy. The telecommunications sector is introduced and the special competition policy issues 
arising in the telecommunications sector are explained. Chapter 3 discusses in general when 
economic theory provides a justification for government intervention into markets by sector-
specific regulation. Chapter 4 introduces different approaches which have been suggested for the 
regulation of the telecommunications sector. These approaches are contrasted to theoretical criteria 
for when regulation may be considered to improve efficiency in a market. The chapter comes to 
normative conclusions for sector-specific regulation in telecommunications. The current regulatory 
framework for communications markets in the EU is presented in Chapter 5. This framework is 
compared to the normative criteria for telecommunications market regulation that were developed 
in chapter 4. Chapter 6 concludes the study. 
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2 The telecommunications sector as a network sector  
2.1 Typical characteristics of network industries 
 
Network industries such as telecommunications, electricity and transportation have in common 
that the production of their services is based on a network infrastructure. Networks are typically 
made up of various transmission lines and network nodes at which these transmission lines are 
interconnected. Generally, a user of a network service requires an exclusive point-to-point 
interconnection between its location and the nearest point of presence of the network at which 
transmission signals can be entered into the network. Up to this point, several lines of 
geographically close users can share a common ductwork. On the next network level, the 
transmission signals transported over the separate local lines can be multiplexed onto a single 
transmission line such that from there on the transmission signals of several users are transported 
via one line.  
 
Network sectors are therefore characterized by significant bundling advantages, especially in 
higher network levels. Because of these bundling advantages, network infrastructures are 
associated with economies of scale. The unit average costs of production decrease with an increase 
in output. If in any given area investment in network inputs takes place, the overall capacity rises 
more than proportional. Services based on network infrastructures are often also associated with 
economics of scope, because different applications can share a common infrastructure, such that it 
is more efficient for a single firm to provide the market with multiple products than for several 
firms to separately provide these products. Substantial economies of scale and scope can be an 
indication of natural monopoly characteristics of a market. A market is considered a natural 
monopoly when a single firm can produce the market output at lower costs than several firms.  
 
A second notable characteristic of many network industries is that demand is characterized by 
network effects. Network effects are a special kind of externality. Positive network effects in 
consumption are present whenever the consumption of a good or a service is valued more, the 
higher the number of other users of this good or service. In communications networks especially, a 
user’s utility is positively related to the number of other users on the network since the possibilities 
for interaction are increased with more users on a network. The addition of a new user increases 
the willingness to pay of existing users in the network. However, when there is no price attached to 
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the external effect, then market processes will not necessarily lead to an efficient consumption 
level of the network service. In the absence of network interconnection the benefits from network 
effects will be higher on larger networks as compared to smaller networks.  
 
2.2 Specific characteristics of the telecommunications sector 
The telecommunications sector is characterized by large specific investments into a network 
structure. This leads to significant economics of scale and economics of scope. Moreover, a 
significant part of the investments costs is sunk. An idealised telecommunications network 
(focused on the fixed transmission of data and voice) consists of three hierarchy levels (Merkt 
1998: 29-30). Figure 1 provides an overview of these hierarchies. The first level comprises the 
connection of the consumers to the network. This connection is called the local loop. The local 
loops jointly use the local ductworks that are connected to the local switching ports. From there 
they are connected to the second hierarchy level, the long distance network. On this level, traffic 
can be further bundled and connected to international gateways. From an international gateway, 
international networks can be accessed.  
 
Figure 1: Schematic telecommunications network 
 
 
Source: Based on Gabelmann (2003: 31). 
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The bundling advantages of telecommunications networks therefore arise in several parts of the 
network. Firstly, whenever transmission lines jointly use a ductwork. Secondly, whenever the 
transmission signals of several lines are bundled in switching and interconnection facilities and 
thereafter transmitted via one single line (Gabelmann, 2003: 30ff.). Up to the capacity limit of a 
ductwork, a transmission line or a switch, the joint use of these facilities by the different consumer 
connections, leads to sinking average production costs (ibid.).  
 
On the demand side, the telecommunications market is characterized by strong network effects. 
The network effects in telecommunications services are direct as well as indirect. The direct 
effects derive from the benefit a consumer obtains from interacting with other users (i.e. a user 
derives utility from being able to exchange telephone calls with other network users). The indirect 
effect derives from the fact that users benefit from the number of other users on the network by 
additional complementary goods, which are made available depending on the overall number of 
users on a network (i.e. the more Internet users exist the more Internet services are offered).  
 
 
3 Competition policy concerns in network sectors 
3.1 Efficiency and market structure 
The typical characteristics of network sectors, natural monopoly on the cost side, as well as 
network externalities on the demand side, are traditionally viewed as sources of market failure 
(Viscusi et al., 2000: 314). In monopoly markets there is a conflict between productive and 
allocative efficiency. Productive efficiency requires that the resources devoted to producing a 
given output are minimized. In a natural monopoly, productive efficiency is generally achieved 
because there is a single producer in the market. Allocative efficiency requires that all resources 
are allocated to their most productive usage. Allocative efficiency is generally associated with 
competitive markets because prices which conform to marginal costs of production result in 
resource allocation according to productive usage. In monopolies, however, the competitive 
pressures which drive prices towards marginal costs often do not exist.4  
 
                                                 
4 Only in the case of a contestable natural monopoly is the monopolist under competitive pressure and cannot realize 
above-competitive profits over an extended time period. 
  6
Network externalities are viewed as a source of market failure because new entrants to the market 
need to gather a minimum number of users on their network in order to be able to offer the 
network benefits necessary to attract customers. The need to reach this so-called critical mass may 
constitute a barrier to entry in this market. Therefore, it might happen that an entrant providing a 
new network that is technically superior to the incumbents’ network, or available at lower cost, 
cannot grant consumers an offer that compensates them for the missing network benefits. The 
consumers’ willingness to pay for the new network might be low or possibly zero. This can 
prevent market entry (Gabelmann 2002: 33f.). Another concern resulting from network effects is 
the waste of surplus that could occur in fragmented industries, which hinder consumers to exploit 
the benefits of larger networks (Gabelmann 2002: 34). The reason is that if there are several 
networks, which are not interconnected, then consumers do not derive utility from being able to 
communicate with the consumers on the other networks. A consumer does not take these costs and 
benefits into account when he decides on his level of consumption. Therefore, he will choose 
either a too high or a too low level of consumption compared to the socially optimal level.  
 
Productive and allocative efficiency are static efficiency concepts. They neglect the objective of 
dynamic efficiency, a concept which focuses on the inter-temporal efficiency of markets. From a 
static perspective, perfect competition may be welfare maximizing. However, from the perspective 
of dynamic efficiency, in a perfectly competitive equilibrium, with zero economic profits, 
innovation and investment incentives may be too low.  
 
The competition policy evaluation of market structures should make allowance for inter-temporal 
welfare considerations by regarding competition in a market not as a static state but rather as a 
dynamic process (Kirzner, 1973: 88ff.). Hayek (1968) describes competition as a discovery 
process in which new and better solutions are continuously sought and found. This continuous 
process entails that market structure is constantly in flux and can temporarily also exhibit high 
concentration (Evans et al., 2005). Schumpeter (1943) was the first scholar to develop a dynamic 
theory of competition and innovation. His idea of “creative destruction” postulates that 
competition is a process of continuous innovation. Innovations can grant temporary monopoly 
status. The supra-normal profits which are made by a monopolist, however, attract new 
investments into the market and the monopolist may be replaced by a new temporary monopolist.  
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There exist a multitude of theoretical models and empirical studies on the question of how market 
concentration relates to innovation and investment.5 There are models that support the 
Schumpeterian idea that monopolies are more likely to innovate (i.e. Gilbert et. al., 1982) and 
others that negate a straightforward relationship (Vickers, 1985). In opposition to Schumpeter’s 
theory Hicks has, for instance, argued that “…the best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life” 
(Hicks, 1935: 8). A quiet life, with low competitive pressure, will result in a low level of 
innovation (Gilbert 2006: 179f.). Aghion et al. (2005) find evidence that the relationship between 
competition and innovation has the shape of an inverted “U”. At first, innovation increases with a 
move from strong competition to less competition in a market. However, a maximum of 
innovation is reached well before the monopoly case.  
 
When competitive forces are restricted because of market failures, competition policy may be 
called for to modify market conditions such that welfare is improved. However, the conflict 
between static and dynamic efficiency properties of markets complicates attaining a clear position 
on when competition policy intervention may be beneficial in a market. 
 
3.2 General competition policy vs. sector-specific regulation 
If government intervention into markets is deemed necessary the implementation of two general 
instruments to promote economic efficiency, is possible. On the one hand, there is sector-specific 
regulation. On the other hand, there are general competition law interventions. These instruments 
differ in several aspects.  
 
General competition law applies to all sectors of the economy. It is concerned with the supervision 
of mergers and acquisitions, with monopolization and with cartelization of markets. In “single 
dominance” (monopolization) or “collective dominance” (cartelization) cases the competition 
authority investigates claims of anti-competitive behavior, such as tying, predatory pricing, or 
refusals to deal. Competition authorities have the authority to reject or approve mergers, to impose 
fines and to prohibit particular behavior by dominant firms.  
 
Market intervention based on general competition law is always decided on a case-by-case basis. 
Competition authorities can, in theory, use several market characteristics to approximate market 
dominance. In practice, the criterion most often applied to measure market dominance is the 
                                                 
5  See Gilbert (2006).  
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relative market share in the relevant product market. Further criteria used are the existence of 
barriers to expansion and entry and the market position of buyers in the market.6 Generally, 
antitrust is applied ex-post when abuse of market power has been established (at least according to 
the competition authority). Only in merger policy a decision needs to be taken ex-ante, before the 
consequences for the market can be directly observed.  
 
In contrast to general competition law, sector-specific regulations are designed for a particular 
industry. Regulation is far more intrusive than antitrust action because the intervention pertains to 
ongoing activities of the regulated firm. Regulation can, for instance, be applied to restrict the 
price-setting freedom of the regulated firm or to mandate access to its industrial or intellectual 
property. A further fundamental difference to general competition policy is the fact that sector-
specific regulation is generally instated ex-ante to prevent abuse of market power, which has not 
yet occurred. Lastly, since regulation is generally ongoing, the potential for phasing-out of 
regulation needs to be reviewed explicitly. As antitrust decisions are taken on a case-by-case basis 
they do not need to be reviewed again.  
 
When should which instrument be applied? To justify sector-specific regulation, stable market 
power must be identified ex-ante. This instrument can only be used when a restrictive definition of 
market power comes to a clear assessment. The definition must relate to market structure as 
market behaviour can only be observed ex-post. When regulation can thus be justified, then its 
advantages as compared to general competition policy are: it is quicker to respond to market 
failures. Also, as a regulatory agency is often responsible for a market over a longer period, it can 
continuously collect data and will therefore be able to complement qualitative analyses by 
quantitative evidence. Antitrust agencies have more limited access to data and are often restricted 
to qualitative analysis. However, since uncertainty reduces over time, antitrust can avoid mistakes, 
which might occur in regulation. 
 
                                                 
6 Traditionally, competition authorities were quick to equate large market shares with market power (Spulber, 1989: 
501). Competition authorities have increasingly recognized the shortcomings of this simplified approach and are 
striving to enrich their definition of market dominance by adding more criteria (see, for instance, a speech which 
Neelie Kroes, member of the European Commission in charge of competition policy gave before the Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute on 23rd September 2005, entitled “Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review of Article 
82.”) 
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3.3 Market failures as justification for sector-specific regulation 
The conditions under which market failures are so severe as to warrant sector-specific regulation 
are a matter of controversy among scholars. Not only is it difficult to formulate the proper policy 
objectives for network sectors. Once policy objectives are decided on it is also very difficult for 
policy makers to assess when the market constellations are such that market outcomes deviate so 
strongly from aspired policy objectives as to justify market intervention. Any decision in favor of 
government intervention needs to bear in mind the trade-off between costs and gains from policy 
intervention. The costs of government intervention into market processes are not only the 
administrative costs of implementing regulation. There are also inefficiencies in any political 
process, which need to be taken into account. These result from the unintended consequences of 
regulation (i.e. Averch and Johnson, 1962) but also from the fact that a regulator does not 
necessarily have the interest of the general public in mind but is rather susceptible to rent-seeking 
by parties interested in the regulatory outcome (Stigler, 1971). Given the institutional and 
informational constraints under which government interventions into market processes take place, 
a non-intervention market outcome may well be closer to the ideal norm than an intervention 
outcome, even when market failure is apparent. This holds even more, the less severe the market 
failure which is to be corrected and also the more dynamic the market, in which the market failure 
is observed, because market conditions in these markets change rapidly.  
 
A formal depiction of the trade-off that needs to be considered in implementing any competition 
policy is the distinction of Type-1 and Type-2 errors (Knieps, 2006: 70). A Type-1 error is 
committed when competition authorities intervene in a market even though competition is 
effective (false positive). A Type-2 error is committed when competition policy is not applied, 
even though market power is inhibiting effective competition (false negative). Most industrialized 
democracies are committed to free markets and fear a weakening of the market process in their 
countries. When free market processes are to remain the norm, and also when considering the 
limitations of regulation, then it is better to err on the side of committing a Type-2 error as 
compared to the side of committing a Type-1 error. Market intervention should therefore be made 
difficult by placing strong demands on the justification of sector-specific regulation. 
 
The likelihood of committing a Type-1 error (false positive) is larger in sector-specific regulation 
than in antitrust policy. The most important reason for this is that regulation is implemented before 
abuse of market power has occurred. It is therefore based on less reliable conjectures of what 
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might have happened had market processes run their course. Furthermore, sector-specific 
regulation requires more information on the industry to fine-tune regulatory intervention than 
antitrust actions, which generally only prohibit particular actions, afford. This information is 
difficult to impossible for regulators to obtain. Lastly, regulation is far more intrusive with respect 
to the freedoms of the regulated firm than general competition policy. For all of these reasons, 
sector-specific regulation is likely to commit a Type-1 error. As a consequence, regulation should 
be based on an even stronger justification for market intervention than general competition law 
(Knieps, 2006: 49). A robust definition of market power is needed which can make it plausible that 
the market outcome can be improved by the application of regulation.  
 
Market entry barriers as justification for market intervention 
A robust definition of market power must be capable of differentiating between the typical 
characteristics of network industries which promote a market structure of only few large firms and 
stable market power which allows incumbent firms to make above competitive profits over an 
extended time period without inducing market entry. To assess competition in a network market, 
the regulator needs to understand when competitive forces are sufficient to restrain market power. 
This can be approached by analyzing the possibilities of market entry for the particular market. 
 
There are different traditions in economic theory on market entry barriers. The traditional 
industrial economic theory on entry barriers is represented by Bain (1956). Embedded in the 
structural approach, which explains market outcomes by a given market structure, Bain formulated 
a broad theory of market entry barriers that includes variations of economies of scale, product 
differentiation advantages of incumbents, and capital requirements (Schmalensee, 1989: 968). In 
essence, Bain considers all market characteristics that lend cost advantages to an incumbent firm to 
be barriers to entry, even if these cost advantages are only temporary. For example, if economies 
of scale allow the installed firm to produce a higher level of output at lower average costs of 
production, then, according to Bain, this must be looked at as a barrier to market entry. Potential 
entrants would initially produce less output at higher costs. Also, when product differentiation by 
the incumbent forces potential entrants to spend more on advertising than the incumbent is 
currently spending, then this is considered a barrier to market entry. 
 
A far more narrow definition of barriers to entry was formulated by Stigler, a representative of the 
Chicago School. Stigler defines: “A barrier to entry [...] as a cost of producing (at some or every 
rate of output) which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by 
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firms already in the industry” (Stigler, 1968: 67). This definition focuses on long-run cost 
asymmetries between an incumbent firm and firms willing to enter the industry. The foremost 
reason for long-term cost advantages held by incumbents is the irreversibility of investments 
necessary for production. When the incumbent has already made these investments, their costs are 
no longer decision-relevant to him. They are, however, relevant to a firm contemplating entering 
the industry. Other reasons for asymmetric cost advantages can be that the incumbent, for some 
reason, has access to a more efficient production technology or lower input prices than potential 
entrants, for instance, due to control over natural resources.  
 
 
4 Approaches for regulation in the telecommunications sector 
The general justification for sector-specific regulation in network sectors was illustrated above. 
This chapter will focus on the justification of regulation in the telecommunications sector. It 
introduces two normative approaches for the design and the implementation of regulation in 
telecommunications. These approaches are prominent examples for the fundamental principles that 
are being discussed in theory as well as in regulatory practice of telecommunications markets. 
These approaches also demonstrate very nicely how important the theories of market entry barriers 
are in the justification of regulation. 
 
4.1 The disaggregated regulatory approach 
A reference model, which was designed explicitly to localize stable market power in network 
industries is the bottleneck theory (Knieps, 1997). This theory is based on a strict application of 
Stigler’s definition of entry barriers in the context of network industries. It states that only network 
areas which combine the characteristics of a sustainable natural monopoly with irreversible 
investments have entry barriers that lend stable market power to incumbent firms. The formal 
definition of these network areas, so-called monopolistic bottlenecks, is given as (Knieps, 2006: 
53): 
- The incumbent controls a facility which is necessary for reaching consumers and no second 
or third such facility exists such that there is no active substitute for the facility in the 
market. This is the case when, due to economies of scale and economies of scope, it is less 
costly to have only one supplier of this facility in the market (natural monopoly situation). 
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- The facility cannot be duplicated by a potential entrant in an economically feasible way. 
Hence, there is no potential substitute for the facility. This is the case when the costs of the 
facility are irreversible. 
 
Both conditions need to be fulfilled if an incumbent is to have stable market power. A natural 
monopoly alone is not sufficient to substantiate network-specific market power because it is not 
established that potential competition will not effectively discipline the incumbent.7 Further, 
irreversible investments alone are not sufficient to deter market entry as long as several active 
firms can operate in a market. Only when an incumbent natural monopolist has made irreversible 
investments does this give him an asymmetric cost-advantage over potential competitors in the 
sense of Stigler’s definition of entry barriers. The irreversible investments are no longer decision-
relevant to the incumbent, but are part of the calculation made by entrants contemplating market 
entry. The credible threat that the incumbent will lower its prices to the level of variable costs 
prevents potential entrants from entering the market. Potential competition is therefore not 
effective when large sunk costs are associated with market entry. Network industries are 
particularly vulnerable to this type of market power because large infrastructure investments create 
scale advantages and are often to a large degree sunk.8 
 
There exists a regulatory approach which uses the bottleneck theory to identify network-specific 
market power as a justification for regulation. According to this disaggregated regulatory 
approach (Knieps, 1997 and 2006) the task of regulation is to “design a system for guaranteeing 
access to monopolistic bottlenecks” (Knieps and Zenhäusern, 2007: 9).9 The disaggregated 
approach uses a layered model of network industries and examines the separable elements of the 
value chain in a disaggregated manner (Knieps, 2006: 53). It can thereby identify on the lowest 
specifiable level those market segments that are competitive and those market segments that are 
                                                 
7 That natural monopoly alone does not lend market power to an incumbent is the central proposition of the 
contestable markets theory by Baumol et. al (1982). This theory can be seen as a precursor of the bottleneck theory 
(Knieps, 2006: 55). The aim of the contestable markets theory is to expand the traditional reference scenario of 
perfect competition to an alternative and more general reference scenario, compatible also with natural monopolies 
(Mantzavinos, 1994: 56). It derives the precise market conditions which guarantee market entry into markets with 
above competitive profits. The bottleneck theory focuses on the opposite viewpoint. It seeks to define market 
characteristics that lend stable market power to incumbent firms. It derives those market conditions that discourage 
market entry, even when above competitive profits are being made. 
8 Von Weizsäcker points out that when economies of scale are present, very often the incumbent firm will own plant 
and equipment dedicated to the particular industry, such that the theoretical and empirical work on economies of 
scale as a barrier to entry may have misjudged the actual cause of the entry barrier (v. Weizsäcker, 1980: 401). 
9 The design of access regulation within the disaggregated regulatory framework will be introduced in more detail in 
Chapter 9. 
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characterized by monopolistic bottlenecks. Access regulation is only to be applied to those 
network elements which conform to the definition of monopolistic bottlenecks.10 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the disaggregated regulatory framework. All network areas that do not show 
natural monopoly characteristics are characterized by active competition (quadrants 3 and 4). 
According to the framework there is no need for sector-specific regulation in these network areas. 
Those network areas showing natural monopoly characteristics, but no substantial sunk 
investments, are considered contestable (quadrant 2). Only when natural monopoly characteristics 
are combined with substantial sunk costs (quadrant 1) should ex-ante regulation be considered.  
 
Figure 2: The localization of monopolistic bottlenecks 
 
Knieps (2001) employs the disaggregated approach to localize network-specific market power in 
the telecommunications sector. He differentiates between telecommunications services and 
telecommunications infrastructure. Telecommunications services must be considered at least 
contestable, if not competitive. Even when these markets may be characterized by economies of 
scale and scope, there are no sunk investments which need to be undertaken in order to be able to 
                                                 
10 Laffont and Tirole (2000: 98) also distinguish between bottleneck segments and potentially competitive segments 
of network industries. They also argue for access regulation to bottlenecks in order to preserve competition in 
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Source: Based on Knieps, 2000:  96.
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become active on the services market. Suppliers of value-added services can replace inefficient 
suppliers of telecommunications services since legal entry barriers have been abolished and since 
non-discriminatory access to underlying telecommunications infrastructure should be guaranteed 
by regulation whenever there are monopolistic bottlenecks. There is therefore no need for 
regulatory intervention in services markets.  
 
Telecommunications infrastructure can be further differentiated into long-distance networks and 
local-access networks (Knieps, 2005). The market for long-distance network capacity is 
characterized by active and potential competition. Since telecommunications markets liberalization 
a number of firms have invested extensively into long-distance network capacity, especially at the 
time of the sharp increase in capacity demand during the Internet-boom of the late 1990s. There 
are therefore no monopolistic bottleneck network areas in long-distance network capacity.  
 
For a long time it was assumed that local-access telecommunications networks constitute 
monopolistic bottlenecks (Woroch, 2002). Technological advances have made available alternative 
infrastructures for local telecommunications services and are challenging this view. Wireless 
networks, Cable-TV networks and satellite technology are increasingly being employed to transmit 
telecommunications data between the end-user site and the long-distance networks. The 
localization of monopolistic bottlenecks in local access networks therefore needs to take existing 
technological variety and the possibility of future infrastructure-platform competition into account. 
Whenever there is no active or potential infrastructure competition equal-access regulation to local 
access infrastructure continues to be necessary. Generally it can be said that local access networks 
have lost their monopolistic bottleneck character in densely populated areas while in rural regions 
the incumbent telecommunications carrier retains a monopoly position.  
 
The development of competition in telecommunications infrastructure ever since market 
liberalization shows that monopolistic bottlenecks are not stable over time. The advance of new 
technologies or a change in demand can change the extent of the monopolistic bottleneck network 
area. Blankart et al. (2007) demonstrate how technological advances in telecommunications access 
technologies have resulted in a shrinking of the monopolistic bottleneck over time (see Figure 3). 
In traditional Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTN) the monopolistic bottleneck network 
area is made up of the ducts and ductworks in which the local loop is installed, of the copper local 
                                                                                                                                                                
potentially competitive market segments.  
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loop itself, as well as of the local switch installed at the main distribution frame site. When 
broadband DSL technologies are employed, the monopolistic bottleneck area no longer 
encompasses the local switch. With high speed access technologies, such as VDSL, the 
monopolistic bottleneck areas which remain are the local ducts and ductworks.  
 
Figure 3: Shrinking monopolistic bottlenecks 
 
Source: Blankart et al., 2007: 426. 
 
 
4.2 The ladder of investment approach 
An alternative regulatory approach which focuses on regulation in communications markets is the 
ladder of investment approach (Cave et al., 2003, Cave, 2006). This framework uses a broader 
definition of entry barriers than the disaggregated approach. In general, it is less sceptical of 
government intervention into market processes and foresees a more active role for the regulator in 
encouraging competition. The ladder of investment approach is also based on the notion that 
competition can be constrained by the presence of market entry barriers. Entry barriers are 
considered to exist, when it is difficult for a new entrant to replicate an asset that is needed to 
provide the end-user service. The more difficult the replication of the asset, the higher is the entry 
barrier.  
 
The regulator’s function in the ladder of investment approach, is to enable entrants to climb 
successive steps of the investment ladder. Entrants can be expected to invest first in those parts of 
the value-chain most easily duplicated and to acquire a customer base (critical mass) in the retail 
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market by receiving wholesale access to the remaining parts of the value-chain from the incumbent 
operator. The entrants are then expected to successively climb the remaining steps of the 
investment ladder. The regulator has two instruments to set incentives for investments by 
competitors. Firstly, access pricing for the wholesale assets can be used to stear the investment 
decision. When access prices rise over time, this increases the incentive to self-provide facilities 
and therefore to invest. Secondly, the regulator can announce that wholesale access to the 
incumbent’s assets will be available for a limited time-period only. Entrants then know that to 
remain in the market they must replicate the asset in question by the time the wholesale offer is 
withdrawn. 
 
The provision of telecommunications services is based on several inputs and services. These 
necessary elements constitute a value-chain. In relation to the difficulty of duplicating the elements 
of the value chain it is possible to describe a path of progressive investment, which new entrants 
must follow in order to be able to serve the market with own facilities. In practice, Cave (2006: 
229ff.) suggests that National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) use cost models and existing 
analyses to determine the relative difficulty of replication of these assets. To decide where on the 
ladder of investment to intervene, a regulator should then employ evidence of replication in similar 
circumstances and evidence from cost-modelling (ibid., 231). 
 
Figure 4 illustrates how the ladder of investment changes in the transition from PSTN to 
broadband communications. For broadband telecommunications markets, Cave concludes that the 
copper local loop occupies the lowest rung on the ladder of investment, as it is characterized by the 
fact that it is the least replicable asset among the network elements needed to offer 
telecommunications services. The DSLAM (= Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer, a 
device which multiplexes the signals of several DSL lines onto one high-speed backbone line) 
collocated at the main distribution frame site of the incumbent, occupies the next rung on the 
investment ladder. The replicability of the DSLAM depends on the expected economies of scale a 
newcomer can achieve at one co-location site, determined by the number and the mix of customers 
the newcomer expects to serve at this site. Next in rank is the backhaul network. Its replicability 
depends on circumstances that determine the capacity demand on any given route. Central routes 
with more traffic will allow more active competition than “thin” routes in remote regions. The 
following core network is characterized by a higher likelihood for replicability, as suggested both 
by modelling as well as by observable investments. The last rungs on the investment ladder are 
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occupied by web-access services and retail/resale services. Both are characterized by effective 
competition.  
 
 
Figure 4: Changing Ladder of Investment 
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In contrast to the hypothesis of a shrinking monopolistic bottleneck in the disaggregated regulatory 
approach, the ladder of investment approach does not necessarily foresee a reduction in regulation 
as a consequence of the transition from narrowband to broadband services. Of course, the ladder of 
investment does not reflect regulated market areas. Actual regulatory intervention in the ladder of 
investment approach depends on the NRAs assessment of the difficulty of replicating the assets on 
the investment ladder. It is therefore not possible to compare the elements of the investment ladder 
to localized monopolistic bottlenecks. It can, however, be said that the NRA generally has more 
freedoms to introduce wider regulation in the ladder of investment approach as compared to the 
disaggregated approach. 
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4.3 Regulation and dynamic efficiency 
The regulatory approaches introduced above focus on the static efficiency properties of 
competitive markets and therefore emphasize entry-barriers which may impede competition. It was 
already stated above that dynamic efficiency is also an important policy objective and that this can 
complicate the formulation of policy objectives for regulation as dynamic efficiency properties are 
often associated with markets that show at least some degree of concentration. This section 
evaluates the importance of this conflict in telecommunications markets. 
 
The telecommunications market is currently undergoing a fundamental change from a circuit-
switched network dominated by voice traffic to an all-IP based network capable of transporting 
voice, Internet and broadcasting applications. This change is accompanied by large investments in 
so-called next generation networks. The need for large investments has increased the awareness 
that regulation needs to respect dynamic efficiency criteria. 
 
To implement a regulatory framework, which takes into account the possible trade-off between 
static and dynamic efficiency in the telecommunications infrastructure Baake et al. (2005) 
emphasize that the main driver of innovation is Schumpeterian competition. They argue that 
competition is most effective when there are competing infrastructures. Ex-ante regulation often 
destroys incentives for investment in infrastructure, because it leads to a situation in which a 
dominating undertaking covers all the risks of an investment, but cannot appropriate all the 
benefits. Competitors, on the other hand, can avoid investment risk by employing the incumbent’s 
assets. For the regulation of new markets, Baake et al. (ibid.) suggest that regulation should only 
be implemented if there is no chance of infrastructure competition in the long term. If 
infrastructure competition is lacking in the short- to medium term only, then the company with the 
initial investment should be allowed to utilize this investment exclusively for a specified period 
without any regulatory intervention. The concept that new markets should thus be excluded from 
sector-specific regulation for several years has been called “regulatory holiday”. 
 
Vogelsang (2006: 38) argues for a differentiated assessment of when regulatory holidays may be 
justified to enhance incentives for investment. He differentiates between innovations and 
investment. A technology that is new on the national level, but already used successfully in other 
countries, does not qualify as a new market in the sense that it can be considered an especially 
risky innovation needing special promotion in the form of a regulatory holiday. Investments are 
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always risky and it is correct to consider this in regulation. Regulatory holidays should, however, 
apply to real innovations only.  
 
With respect to innovations, Vogelsang (ibid., 41) differentiates between innovations which rely 
on existing bottlenecks and innovations which are based on the creation of new bottlenecks. 
Whenever existing bottlenecks are the foundation for new innovations, the incumbent must grant 
non-discriminatory access to these bottlenecks. Regulatory holidays may then be granted on 
services markets only. When innovations are based on newly created bottlenecks, then regulatory 
holidays may be an option whenever the pioneer-monopoly status can be expected to be only 
temporary. When one can expect competitors to invest in innovations which compete with the 
incumbent’s innovation then regulatory holidays may lead to the development of “serial 
monopolies” à la Schumpeter. If, however, competitive forces are hampered by the pioneer-
monopoly for a longer time period, then Vogelsang argues that risk-adjustments to cost-based 
regulation should be favoured over regulatory holidays as a means to stimulate innovation. On the 
one hand, he suggests risk mark-ups on regulated prices for investments that should include not 
only the portfolio risk of an undertaking, but also the specific risk of an investment and a 
contribution to research and development costs. For wholesale products, he argues that access 
regulation can be designed such that the innovating firm is granted compensation of the full 
monopoly profits. Since competitors receive wholesale-access to the investment they are at least 
granted the possibility to enter the market and may even undersell the monopolist by operating 
more cost-efficiently (Baumol-Willig-Rule). 
 
From the point of view of the disaggregated regulatory approach there can be no economic 
justification for regulatory holidays (Knieps, 2006: 68f. and Knieps, 2005b: 88ff.). Regulatory 
holidays can only be meaningful in cases where regulation would be justified due to ownership of 
monopolistic bottlenecks. And if such a bottleneck would be identified, then regulation would be 
necessary from the very beginning. Otherwise consumers would suffer a welfare loss from delayed 
competition in the market. To provide investment incentives, the disaggregated approach implies 
that the regulatory contract needs to commit the regulator ex-ante to a proper compensation for the 
risks involved in making irreversible investments (Knieps, 2005b: 90).11 Blankart et al. (2007: 8) 
                                                 
11 The Access Directive of the European Regulatory Framework (2002/19/EC, Art. 13(1)) explicitly allows taking 
account of investment risks in the price regulation of access. 
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state that “the reference point for economically efficient investment signals is a market rate of 
return and not a monopolistic profit.”  
 
That the disaggregate regulatory approach abandons the option to grant regulatory holidays 
completely has to do with the fact that this approach already strives to mimimize regulation. For 
instance, the disaggregated regulatory approach, as a basic principle, does not allow regulatory 
intervention on the service level, whereas many of the above mentioned instances in which others 
have argued for regulatory holidays referred to services markets. It is possible, when an investment 
into new infrastructure is particularly risky, that the regulator will find it too difficult to provide 
the proper investment incentives via price regulation alone. Such circumstances will be rare, and 
they may justify regulatory holidays. A thorough case-by-case analysis will be necessary to 
identify these cases.  
 
4.4 Conclusions for the design of telecommunications regulation 
It was argued above that government intervention into markets has many limitations. Even if 
regulation could be designed such that regulators act solely in the interest of social welfare, the 
difficulty of reconciling static and dynamic efficiency considerations remains. In practice, 
regulatory policy must deal with this conflict by weighing the relative importance of static and 
dynamic efficiency in a specific situation. The conflict is especially strong in dynamic markets 
such as the telecommunications market. In these markets, if regulation is applied too liberally, it 
can stifle innovation and result in considerable welfare loss. The difficulties in defining the 
objectives a regulator should pursue and also the limitations that result from institutional and 
informational constraints in regulation suggest that regulation should be applied restrictively. As a 
guiding principle, regulation should only be applied whenever market failure is so severe that it is 
likely that also imperfect regulation can achieve a considerable change for the better. To identify 
such circumstances, regulatory policy must be based on a stable and restrictive criterion of market 
power.  
 
Of the above introduced concepts for regulation in communications markets, only the 
disaggregated regulatory approach is committed to minimal regulation and uses a limiting 
principle to localize network-specific market power. The definition of a monopolistic bottleneck 
limits the regulator’s ability to identify objects of regulation. The ladder of investment approach is 
not based on a stable criterion of market power. This approach extends far broader powers to the 
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regulator for defining the extent of regulation. This approach is therefore susceptible to 
overregulation, especially considering that it does not address the concerns raised by the positive 
theory of regulation with respect to rent-seeking in regulated markets.  
 
Price regulation of monopolistic bottleneck network areas 
When applying the disaggregated regulatory approach, it is the task of the regulator to guarantee 
non-discriminatory access to monopolistic bottlenecks. Optimally, the regulation of access prices 
to monopolistic bottlenecks should perform three objectives. Firstly, prices should provide signals 
for allocative efficiency. In competitive markets, marginal-cost prices steer resource allocation into 
efficient usage. Marginal cost prices, however, cannot cover all costs in markets featuring large 
fixed costs. Secondly, prices should encourage productive efficiency by sending the right signals 
for the decision on whether joint usage of a bottleneck or bypass investments by new entrants are 
economically efficient (Armstrong, 2002: sec. 2.4.1). Prices that reflect the incremental costs of 
additional usage of the bottleneck resource would meet this requirement. Lastly, access charges 
should send signals for dynamic efficiency and cover the total (efficient) costs of the monopolistic 
bottleneck, not merely its incremental cost. Only then does the regulated firm earn a rate of return 
that provides it with an incentive to maintain the network and invest into innovations.  
 
These objectives for optimal price regulation are incompatible when the regulatory instrument 
consists of only one access charge. Any mark-up on marginal, respectively incremental costs that 
is required to cover the large fixed and common costs of network infrastructures will lead to 
inefficient usage of the bottleneck network elements. When only a linear access price is available 
to pursue the conflicting policy objectives of access-price regulation, then regulatory theory 
proposes a Ramsey-pricing structure as the second-best alternative to marginal cost pricing.12 
Ramsey-prices are obtained by maximizing social welfare under the constraint that a given 
revenue must be raised. This pricing approach yields prices that include mark-ups on marginal 
costs, which are inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand (Baumol and Bradford, 1970: 
269f.). The lower the elasticity of demand for a given product, the higher will be the mark-up on 
marginal costs. By this pricing rule, the loss in social welfare which results from the need to cover 
total costs of production is minimized as quantity reactions to a price increase are lowest for those 
portions of demand that are inelastic. 
                                                 
12 The term Ramsey-pricing originates from work by Frank Ramsey on the question of how a government can raise a 
given tax revenue with a minimum of utility loss (Laffont and Tirole, 2000: sec. 2.1.1). 
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A regulatory authority cannot “set” the welfare-maximizing Ramsey-prices because it lacks the 
necessary information on the demand elasticities of consumers as well as the production costs of 
the regulated products. However, the regulatory authority can create an environment in which it is 
in the interest of the regulated firm to set prices that approximate the positive welfare effects of 
Ramsey prices (Laffont and Tirole, 2000: sec. 3.4.1). As will be shown below, price-cap 
regulation, which is endorsed in the disaggregated regulatory framework (Knieps, 2006: 66) 
provides incentives for setting prices in inverse proportion to the elasticity of demand.  
 
Price-cap regulation fixes the price level, but not the price structure, for a given basket of regulated 
goods.13  
The key features of this price control are that, for a pre-specified period of 
four to five years, the company can make any changes it wishes to prices, 
provided that the average price of a specified basket of its goods and 
services does not increase faster than RPI-X, where RPI is the Retail Price 
Index (i.e. the rate of inflation) and X is a number specified by the 
government. At the end of the specified period, the level of X is reset by the 
regulator, and the process is repeated (Beesley and Littlechild, 1989: 455). 
 
Price-cap regulation gives the regulated firm the freedom to allocate common costs among the 
products in a product basket in any way it chooses. It increases the incentives for productive 
efficiency by the bottleneck owner because for the regulated time period the operator gets to keep 
any gains in productive efficiency.14 Since the regulated firm’s revenues are maximized by setting 
the prices inversely proportional to the demand elasticities of the products, the resulting prices 
have similar efficiency properties as Ramsey-prices.  
 
To deal with the objective of promoting also dynamic efficiency, price regulation could preserve 
innovation incentives by compensating the investing firm for the risk of failure. To compensate the 
incumbent for the risk associated with new investments into irreversible assets within price-cap 
regulation, a reduction of the factor x, which reflects the expected productivity increase in the 
                                                 
13 Price-cap regulation was developed by Littlechild for the British Department of Industry in the early 1980s during 
the privatization process of British Telecom. Littlechild criticized the prevalent rate-of-return regulation for two 
main reasons. In rate-of-return regulation the regulated firm provides the regulator with information on its 
operating costs and its cost of capital. The regulator, upon auditing these cost accounts, allows a fair rate of return 
on the invested capital. This provides the regulated firm with incentives to inefficiently increase its capital stock 
(Averch and Johnson, 1962). Furthermore, rate-of-return regulation is often applied to the regulated firm as a 
whole. Littlechild was looking for a regulatory instrument that is applied more specifically to monopoly areas only. 
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regulatory period, could be adopted. If a case-by-case analysis shows that for a particularly risky 
investment the regulator cannot provide the proper investment incentives via a higher return on 
investment, a regulatory holiday may need to be considered.  
 
According to the disaggregated regulatory approach, price regulation should be complemented by 
an obligation of the bottleneck owner to keep separate accounts (Knieps, 2006: 67). This allows 
the regulator to monitor the regulated and non-regulated divisions of the regulated operator as 
separately as possible and can more effectively hinder the regulated firm from cross-subsidizing or 
from treating competitors differently from internal divisions. 
 
 
5 Competition policy and regulation in telecommunications in the 
European Union 
In the EU, competition law and sector-specific regulation do not exclude one another. Rather, they 
are meant to complement one another by addressing different kinds of competition problems (de 
Streel 2007: 329). European general competition law is layed down in articles 81 and 82 of the 
treaty of Amsterdam. Both articles are characterised by direct applicability and are enforceable at 
all national courts of all member states of the European Union (Motta 2004: 31). Article 81 
prohibits collusion and other practices restricting competition within the common market of the 
European Union. Article 82 outlaws abusive exploitation of a dominant position by one firm.15 
Sector-specific regulation is generally adopted first by the European Commission and 
subsequently incorporated into national law by the member state governments. This chapter gives 
an overview of current regulatory practice in telecommunications markets in the EU. 
 
5.1 The European regulatory framework for electronic communications 
EU legislation for sector-specific regulation of telecommunications markets was first instated in 
1988 when the Commission opened the markets for terminal equipment. In 1990 the Commission 
declared the exclusive rights of national telecommunications carriers in the markets for value-
added network services to be in violation of the common market. The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 
                                                                                                                                                                
14 In cost-plus regulation the efficiency gains are theoretically “regulated away” as soon as the firm lowers its 
production costs. 
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provided the legal basis for a consultative process on full telecommunications liberalization. In this 
process, the European Parliament accepted the goal to liberalize telecom services and telecom 
networks from January 1998 onwards. The EU directives that were issued until the 1998 
liberalization of most telecommunications markets in the EU are subsumed under the term “1998 
regulatory package.”16  
 
Fast technological developments in the market as well as the trend towards the convergence of 
telecommunication, Internet, and media services led the EU to adopt a new regulatory framework 
for electronic communications in March 2002. The framework consists of the following five 
directives:  
 
Directive 2002/19/EC – Access directive 
Directive 2002/20/EC – Authorisation directive 
Directive 2002/21/EC – Framework directive 
Directive 2002/22/EC – Universal service directive 
Directive 2002/58/EC – Directive on privacy and electronic communications 
 
In addition, the framework includes several accompanying documents as, for instance, the 
Commission’s guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power (EC 
2002/C 165/03).  
 
The 2002 regulatory framework is subject to two basic conditions: firstly, it seeks to offer a 
consistent framework for different electronic communications platforms (2002/21/EC §5), 
secondly, it strives to harmonize the regulation of electronic communications in the EU member-
states. To achieve the first objective, the framework is neutral towards the technology employed 
for the provision of electronic communications. To harmonize regulatory measures in the member-
states, the framework draws from the principles and methodology of competition law, which are 
already common to all member-states. The close accord with competition policy also serves to 
emphasize the transitory character of regulation and is meant to facilitate the transition to an 
oversight by general competition law only, once sector-specific regulation is deemed unnecessary.  
                                                                                                                                                                
15  In general, competition law is enforced ex-post. An exemption of the ex-post character is when competition law is 
applied to merger cases. Mergers are analysed ex-ante and potential remedies are imposed before the merger itself 
takes place.  
16 The European Commission has an informative, archived site on the 1998 regulatory package at: 
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The objective of regulation, according to the Framework Directive (2002/21/EC), is to provide 
successful conditions for effective competition in the telecommunications sector during the 
transition from a monopoly market to full competition. The framework foresees the following 
steps in the process of implementing regulation (each with an indication whether the Commision 
or a NRA, is responsible for the particular measure):  
 
1.  Market selection by application of the three-criteria test  Commission 
2.  Market definition in the context of national markets  NRA 
3.    Assessment of market dominance using SMP criteria  NRA 
4.    Imposition of regulatory remedies on dominant firm  NRA 
5. Supervision of NRA decisions in Article 7 procedures  Commission 
 
Each of these steps is described in more detail below. 
 
5.1.1 Market selection by application of the three-criteria test 
The first step in the analysis of markets begins with the selection of relevant product and service 
markets. With regard to this selection Article 15 of the Framework Directive (2002/21/EC) states 
that the Commission is to recommend markets that may justify the imposition of sector-specific 
regulation. The criteria used by the Commission to identify markets that may not tend to effective 
competition without regulation are subsumed in a so-called “three-criteria test”: 
The first criterion is the presence of high and non-transitory entry barriers 
whether of structural, legal or regulatory nature. …the second criterion admits 
only those markets the structure of which does not tend towards effective 
competition within the relevant time horizon. …The third criterion is that 
application of competition law alone would not adequately address the market 
failures concerned (C(2003)497: §9).17  
 
The three-criteria test applies both static and dynamic efficiency principles (Buigues, 2004: 16). 
The first criterion determines the static efficiency properties of the market by analyzing structural 
and legal entry barriers and the existence of natural monopoly characteristics in the market. The 
second criterion focuses on dynamic efficiency. If entry barriers detected by the first criterion do 
                                                                                                                                                                
 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/98_regpack/index_en.htm 
17 C(2003)497 available at: 
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not persist over the relevant time horizon, then the market does not need to be subjected to 
regulation. The last criterion distinguishes between the scope of general competition law and 
sector-specific regulation. It limits the application of sector-specific regulation to those cases in 
which competition law cannot address the market failures in a sufficient and effective way.  
 
By applying this test, the Commission comes up with a list of markets which may be relevant for 
regulation. The Commission’s list, laid down in the Recommendation on relevant markets, is 
probably the most influential of the accompanying documents to the Framework Directive. 
Legally, the list is not a binding part of the framework. NRAs are, however, expected to critically 
appraise the competitiveness of the markets on the list for their respective countries. In practice, 
regulatory efforts of NRAs have largely concentrated on analyzing the markets on the 
Commission’s list. 
 
The list of recommended markets is continuously reviewed by the Commission. In theory, all of 
the three criteria must be fulfilled for a market to be added to the list. If one of the criteria fails, 
then a market will be taken off the list (ibid.: §16). Currently the Commission’s list includes 18 
markets. Seven of these are on the retail level, as for instance telephone access for residential 
customers, the provision of local calls and the provision of international calls. The remaining 
eleven markets are on the wholesale level, as for instance unbundled access to the local loop, call 
origination and call termination. 
 
5.1.2 Market definition in the context of national markets 
Given the Commission’s recommendation, the NRAs are called upon to define relevant markets 
within their national territories (2002/21/EC, Art. 15). The NRAs are to respect the Commission’s 
recommendation as much as possible and concentrate on defining the geographic boundaries of the 
recommended product and services markets. The Commission has published guidelines for the 
market analysis (2002/C 165/03), which present the NRAs with a set of instruments for their 
analysis. This set of instruments with its procedures and methodologies, relies on the same tools as 
competition law does (ibid., § 25). Although the methodologies are similar, adjustments for the use 
in electronic communications took place.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                
 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/maindocs/documents/recomen.pdf 
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The definition of a relevant market in a given geographical area depends on competitive 
constraints on the price-setting behaviour of producers or service providers by either demand and 
supply-side substitution (ibid., §38). In general, the definition of relevant product or service 
markets follows settled case law: 
 
All those products or services that are sufficiently interchangeable or 
substitutable, not only in terms of their objective characteristics, by virtue of 
which they are particularly suitable for satisfying the constant needs of 
consumers, their prices or their intended use, but also in terms of the conditions 
of competition and/or the structure of supply and demand on the market in 
question (ibid, §44). 
 
The Commission proposes that NRAs analyze these constraints by means of the hypothetical 
monopolist test (ibid., §40). This test is synonymous with the Small but Significant and Non-
transitory Increase in Price-test (SSNIP-test). In this test the effect of a hypothetical price increase 
for a particular product or service of 5-10%, compared to the current price level, is evaluated. The 
response by consumers or producers will show whether there are significant competitive 
constraints for this specific good in the market. If the price increase is not profitable, then the 
good, which is the closest substitute, is included in the delineation of the market and the analysis 
starts from the beginning. This process is repeated until the price increase leads to no significant 
supply-side or demand-side substitution in the market. The products which were included define 
the extent of the relevant market.18 
 
In general, the relevant markets in the electronic communications sector belong to one of two 
categories (ibid., §65), either end-user services (retail markets) or access services to infrastructure 
facilities necessary for service provision (wholesale markets). In §67 of the guidelines wholesale 
markets are defined as markets which include all types of infrastructure necessary for the provision 
of existing services.  
 
5.1.3 The assessment of Significant Market Power 
The application of the three-criteria test by the Commission and the subsequent market analysis by 
the NRAs are only the first steps in the identification of markets warranting sector-specific 
regulation. The confirmation that a relevant market, first identified by the Commission, also exists 
                                                 
18  See also Motta (2004: 102f.).  
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in a national context is not sufficient for the identification of market power. In a third step, to be 
executed by NRAs, the framework foresees an analysis of significant market power (SMP) in the 
identified markets. SMP is defined as “a position of economic strength affording an undertaking 
the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and 
ultimately consumers” (2002/C 165/03, §5). This definition corresponds to the definition of market 
dominance used in EU general competition law.  
 
In practice, NRAs analyze those markets suggested by the EC and which were confirmed by their 
own market analysis (plus any additional markets added by the NRA which pass the three-criteria 
test) using the principles and methodology of general competition law. To assess SMP the 
Commission guidelines emphasize the criterion of market shares (ibid., §75). Market shares below 
40 percent of sales value (or sales volume) are considered to be uncritical, while a market share 
which exceeds 50 percent of sales value is considered sufficient evidence of significant market 
power.19 On the other hand, the Commission recognizes that apart from actual competition, the 
market power of a firm can also be constrained by potential competition (ibid., §74). The 
Commission therefore advises NRAs to also consider the development of market shares over time 
and to interpret stable market shares as evidence of dominance and fluctuating market shares as 
evidence of a lack of market power. Further economic market characteristics that NRAs are to 
consider when assessing SMP are (ibid., §78):  
 
- overall size of the undertaking, 
- control of infrastructure not easily duplicated, 
- technological advantages or superiority 
- absence of or low countervailing buying power 
- easy or privileged access to capital markets/financial resources 
- product/services diversification (e.g. bundled products or services) 
- economies of scale 
- economies of scope 
- vertical integration 
- a highly developed distribution and sales network 
- absence of potential competition 
                                                 
19 In the previous regulatory framework of 1998 a firm used to be designated as having market power that justifies 
ex-ante regulation when its percentage share of sales volume exceeded 25 percent. 
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- barriers to expansion 
 
On the one hand, the listed criteria influence the elasticity of demand (e.g. the absence of or low 
countervailing buying power), on the other hand, they influence the elasticity of supply (e.g. 
barriers to expansion). Additionally, they address the possibility of natural monopoly (e.g. 
economies of scale and scope). The Commission explicitly states that one criterion alone may not 
be a sufficient condition for the assessment of SMP. A cumulative assessment of the criteria is to 
enable the regulator to assess the height of the entry barriers in the market and the persistence of 
these entry barriers over time.  
 
The regulatory framework also addresses the issue of joint dominance. Annex 2 of the Framework 
Directive (2002/21/EC Annex 2) defines that two or more undertakings might be in a jointly 
dominant position, even if there is no structural or legal link between the two, if the structure of 
the market is susceptible to collusion. To assess the existence or possible emergence of collective 
dominance in a market, NRAs are called upon to evaluate market characteristics which are 
conducive to “coordinated effects” (ibid.): 
 
- mature market, 
- stagnant or moderate growth on the demand side, 
- low elasticity of demand, 
- homogeneous product, 
- similar cost structures, 
- similar market shares, 
- lack of technical innovation, mature technology, 
- absence of excess capacity, 
- high barriers to entry, 
- lack of countervailing buying power, 
- lack of potential competition, 
- various kinds of informal or other links between the undertakings concerned, 
- retaliatory mechanisms, 
- lack or reduced scope for price competition  
 
As in the case of SMP determination, the criteria for joint dominance are neither exhaustive nor do 
they need to be proven cumulatively.  
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Table 1 gives an overview of the number of countries that have assessed SMP in the markets 
recommended by the Commission. The numbers indicate that the NRAs strongly tend to confirm 
the Commissions’s view that these markets are not competitive and in most cases find at least one 
operator to have SMP status. 
 
Table 1: Assessment of SMP 
 Number of countries that assessed SMP/No SMP  
Market -SMP -No SMP 
Retail level 
1. Access to the public telephone 
network for residential customers 
2. Access to the public telephone 
network for non-residential 
customers 
3.Local and/or national telephone 
services for residential customers 
4. International telephone services 
for residential customers 
5.Local and/or national services for 
non-residential customers 
6. International telephone services 
for non-residential customers 
7. Minimum set of leased lines 
 
Wholesale level 
8. Call origination from the public 
telephone network at a fixed 
location 
9. Call termination on individual 
public networks at a fixed location 
10. Transit services in the fixed 
public network 
11. Unbundled access (including 
shared access) to metallic loops and 
sub loops 
12. Wholesale Broadband access 
13. Wholesale Termination 
segments 
14. Wholesale Trunk segments 
15. Access and call origination on 
public mobile telephone networks 
16. Call termination on individual 
mobile networks 
 
 
19 
 
18 
 
 
16 
 
12 
 
15 
 
8 
 
16 
 
 
21 
 
 
20 
 
14 
 
20 
 
 
18 
17 
 
8 
6 
 
23 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
4 
 
3 
 
8 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
4 
 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
 
7 
11 
 
0 
Source: Based on Kiesewetter (2007: 8).20 
                                                 
20  Markets 17, and 18 on the Commissions’s list of recommended markets concerning national wholesale markets for 
international roaming on public mobile networks and broadcasting transmission services were not included in the 
study.  
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5.1.4 Remedies 
Once an NRA has defined a relevant market and assessed SMP the NRA is obliged to impose 
appropriate regulatory remedies as suggested in the Access Directive (for wholesale markets) and 
Universal Service Directive (for retail markets). While NRAs can independently choose and 
implement regulatory remedies, they must be justified in relation to the objectives of the regulatory 
framework and must be proportionate to the problem to be solved. When SMP is not found, any 
existing regulations are to be removed.  
 
Regulatory remedies for wholesale markets govern the conditions for interconnection and access. 
By Article 9 of the Access Directive (2002/19/EC, Art. 9), for instance, an undertaking can be 
obliged to make transparent its conditions of interconnection and access. The obligation of 
transparency refers to “accounting information, technical specifications, network characteristics, 
terms and conditions for supply and use and prices”. Usually, the regulated firm will comply with 
this obligation by publishing reference offers for interconnection and access. By Article 10 
(2002/19/EC, Art. 10), an obligation of non-discrimination can be imposed to oblige operators not 
to discriminate between other undertakings and own subsidiaries regarding interconnection or 
access. Article 11 (2002/19/EC, Art. 11) offers a means of enforcing non-discrimination as it 
allows a NRA to oblige vertically integrated companies to keep separate accounts for activities 
related to interconnection and access for third parties as compared to when these services are 
supplied to own subdivisions. By Article 12 (2002/19/EC, Art. 12) regulated undertakings can be 
obliged to offer unbundled access to specified network elements or facilities. These offers must be 
complemented by services which are technically necessary for third parties to use unbundled 
access, such as co-location offers, access to technical interfaces and access to protocols. Article 12 
is also the basis on which regulated undertakings can be obliged to put third parties in a position to 
offer resale of end-user services of the regulated firm. Article 13 (2002/19/EC, Art. 13) gives the 
NRA the authority to impose price controls on wholesale services of the regulated undertaking. 
Regulated wholesale prices are to take capital investment and risk of investment into account and 
allow for a reasonable rate of return on this investment. 
 
With respect to regulation of retail markets, Article 17 of the Universal Services Directive 
(2002/22/EC, Art. 17) allows retail price regulation if other means of regulation (on the wholesale 
market) do not lead to sufficient competition. Therefore, price regulation on retail markets is 
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considered a fallback solution. Retail price regulation can be implemented using price-cap 
controls, cost-orientation or benchmarking on the basis of comparable markets. 
 
The Universal Services directive (2002/22/EC) further demands that member states ensure the 
availability of a “defined minimum set of services to all end-users at an affordable price” (ibid., 
Art. 4). The universal services include access to publicly available telephone services at a fixed 
location (ibid., Art. 4) and to public pay phones (ibid., Art. 6). The financing of universal services 
is addressed in Article 13 (2002/22/EC, Art. 13). If the provision of the universal service is 
considered an unfair burden on the regulated firm, then the firm can either be compensated out of 
public funds, or the costs of universal service provision can be shared between all providers of 
electronic communications networks and services. 
 
5.1.5 Article 7 procedures 
Article 7 of the Framework Directive extends supervisory powers to the European Commission 
with regard to the notifications made by the NRAs. Within a one-month period the Commission 
can either approve of a notification or issue a veto. The veto power applies to the market definition 
of an NRA as well as to the SMP analysis. A veto right does not exist for the remedies proposed 
by an NRA. Should the Commission require more time for an in-depth investigation into the NRA 
analysis, it can append two months of further investigation.  
 
5.2 Current developments 
The 2002 regulatory framework has recently been reviewed by the European Commission. The 
Commission adopted reform proposals in November of 2007. These proposals will be debated by 
the European Parliament and by member-state governments in the coming two years. The 
Commission plans to adopt a revised framework by 2010, which would then need to be 
incorporated into national laws in order to become effective.  
 
In its reform proposals, the Commission has identified two areas needing fundamental reform and 
some areas in which minor changes can improve the framework (see EC, 2006). The first area for 
fundamental reform is spectrum management. Perhaps most important, the Commission wants to 
strengthen the rights of service providers by giving them the freedom to use any technology of 
their choosing in combination with spectrum and the freedom to offer any services of their 
choosing on this spectrum. The second area identified for fundamental reform is the procedure for 
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the review of relevant markets. The Commission plans to simplify the market analysis and 
notification requirements for those markets that were found to be competitive in a previous 
analysis or whenever the notification of the markets features only small changes compared to the 
previous notification.  
 
Among the further changes proposed by the Commission is the intent to enlarge the catalogue of 
remedies by the possibility of functional separation. NRAs could then require incumbent operators 
to split their service divisions and their network-infrastructure divisions. The Commission also 
seeks a reduction in ex-ante regulation by reducing the list of relevant markets. The revised list 
proposes a removal of regulation in 11 of the 18 markets. The only retail market to remain on the 
list is the market for access to the public telephone network. 
 
5.3 Critique of the regulatory framework 
The experience with the 2002 regulatory framework is still relatively short, considering that many 
countries took several years to complete the market analysis of the markets on the Commission’s 
list of recommended markets. The subsequent implementation of remedies took a long time and 
the effects of these remedies are often only now becoming apparent. Therefore, the assessment of 
the European framework remains theoretical in many points. 
 
An essential positive aspect of the framework is that, in many respects, its provisions are based on 
economic theory. The Commission recognizes the importance of potential competition (EC, 2002: 
§74) and the control of bottlenecks (EC, 2002: §78) as criteria to establish whether a firm has 
SMP. The framework also addresses the importance of incentives for innovation and investment 
(Art. 8 (2c) of the Framework Directive). Furthermore, it includes a mechanism for eliminating 
regulatory obligations once these are made obsolete by market developments. A regular review 
process guarantees that market changes and technological developments can influence the 
assessment of SMP in a market and lead to the withdrawal of regulatory burdens.  
 
The proposed reforms of the regulatory framework which concern spectrum management (EC, 
2006: 11ff.) address some of the most pressing issues in furthering infrastructure-platform 
competition in the market for broadband access. Wireless access technologies will become 
especially important in European countries, such as Italy, Spain, and Greece, in which the 
coverage of the Cable-TV network is not good such that alternative infrastructure-platform 
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competition in broadband access would be strengthened significantly by a wireless access 
product.21 The proposed reduction in ex-ante regulation is an important signal that deregulation of 
electronic communications markets remains an ultimate policy objective.  
 
The most important drawback of the European regulatory framework is its tendency to 
overregulation. Overregulation is, in part, addressed by the reform proposals of the EC. The 
suggested reforms are, however, not far-reaching enough. The European framework continues to 
lack a clearly defined limiting criterion for the application of ex-ante regulatory measures. The 
three-criteria test underlying the regulatory framework is, in essence, in accordance with the theory 
of monopolistic bottlenecks and could successfully be used to limit regulation to instances in 
which monopolistic bottlenecks hinder competitive market outcomes (Blankart et al., 2007: 11). 
The “presence of high and non-transitory entry barriers” (first criterion) in economic terms could 
be rewritten as a market with natural monopoly characteristics requiring sunk investments. Such a 
monopoly can be considered to pass criterion two, which requires the market to not tend towards 
effective competition within the relevant time horizon. In current practice, however, the three-
criteria test is not being applied in this economically sound manner. The Commission has added 
markets to the list of relevant markets, which cannot be considered natural monopolies (this holds 
especially true for all of the retail markets on the list). Oldale and Padilla (2004) even speculate 
that the list of relevant wholesale markets is artificially inflated in order to facilitate short-term 
successes in market performance by increasing the number of firms active in the retail markets. 
They criticize the fact that the framework relies on competition law instruments for market 
analysis, but does not use the “limiting principles embedded in the competition law rules […] 
when specifying the remedies to be used” (ibid., 52).  
 
Besides the fact that the three-criteria test is not used to limit regulatory intervention to instances 
in which network-specific market power can be identified, the framework introduces a second step 
in which SMP status needs to be determined for the imposition of regulatory remedies. The SMP 
criteria of the Commission are open to much wider interpretation of market power than the criteria 
the bottleneck theory applies for the identification of network-specific market power. The criterion 
“control of infrastructure not easily duplicated” is open to interpretation because of the unspecified 
nature of the term “not easily.” The required economies of scale and scope are common in network 
industries. The bottleneck theory requires these to be relevant over the entire market output, thus 
                                                 
21 See OECD (2005: 219, Table 7.3). 
  35
substantiating a natural monopoly. Yet, the SMP criteria of the Commission are not clear on this 
point. Especially the focus on market shares for the assessment of SMP does not seem appropriate 
if one recalls the fact that network industries often have only few large market players even when 
they are competitive or potentially competitive. The notifications of the NRAs so far show that, in 
practice, their determination of SMP is in large degree based on market shares. Even if the 
threshold for assuming market power has moved from 25 percent market share to 50 percent, there 
is a danger that the value attached to the other criteria mentioned by the Commission pales in 
comparison to the easily grasped and readily available market-share figures. Finally, sunk costs are 
missing from the catalogue of SMP criteria, which also shows that the European Commission 
defines SMP wider than the bottleneck theory defines network-specific market power. 
 
The regulatory framework has no unambiguous position regarding the handling of new and 
emerging markets. On the one hand, §27 of the Framework Directive (2002/21/EC) states that in 
new and emerging markets the market leader should not be subject to inappropriate obligations. § 
15 of the Market Recommendation (C(2003)497) even states that new and emerging markets, 
where first mover advantages cause market power, “should not in principle be subject to ex-ante  
regulation”. According to §32 of the guidelines on market analysis (2002/C 165/03), on the other 
hand foreclosure by the leading company is to be prevented. It is clear that the Commission 
recognized the trade-off between regulation and investment incentives. So far, however, the 
regulatory framework includes no clear guidelines on how new and emerging markets are to be 
treated. As was concluded in chapter 4 above, to ensure adequate investment incentives in 
electronic communications markets, it is imperative that ex-ante regulation be minimized by 
aligning the three-criteria test with the theory of monopolistic bottlenecks. Generally it is sufficient 
to compensate for investment risks in price regulation. In rare cases it may be necessary to protect 
investments into particularly risky infrastructure projects by regulatory holidays.  
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6 Conclusions 
In the present study regulatory practice in the telecommunications sector and its normative 
foundation was evaluated. A description of the telecommunications sector showed that as a typical 
network sector it is characterized by economies of scale and scope as well as high sunk costs. On 
the demand side, strong network effects characterize the telecommunications sector. This 
combination may lead to competition problems due to the possibility of monopolization and abuse 
of market power. There may be a need to address these competition concerns by sector-specific 
regulation.  
 
Government intervention into markets has many limitations. Even if regulation could be designed 
such that regulators act solely in the interest of social welfare, the difficulty of reconciling static 
and dynamic efficiency considerations remains. In practice, regulatory policy must deal with this 
conflict by weighing the relative importance of static and dynamic efficiency in a specific 
situation. The conflict is especially strong in dynamic markets such as the telecommunications 
market. In these markets, if regulation is applied too liberally, it can stifle innovation and result in 
considerable welfare loss. Therefore, regulatory policy should be based on a stable and restrictive 
criterion of market power. From the presented approaches only the disaggregated regulatory 
approach is committed to minimal regulation and uses a limiting principle to localize network-
specific market power.  
 
The normative conclusions on regulation were compared to the provisions in the European 
Regulatory Framework for electronic communications. In many respects, the framework is based 
on economic theory. Most importantly, the Commission recognizes the importance of potential 
competition and the control of bottlenecks as criteria to establish whether a firm has significant 
market power. The framework also addresses the importance of incentives for innovation and 
investment. However, the regulatory framework has a strong tendency to overregulation. This is 
addressed, at least in part, by the reform proposals for the framework currently discussed in the 
European parliament. The suggested reforms are, however, not far-reaching enough. The central 
problem of the framework for the regulation of electronic communications is that it lacks a clearly 
defined limiting criterion for the application of ex-ante regulatory measures.  
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